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OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE: AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS WITH
RELEVANCE TODAY

By

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
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE: AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS WITH RELEVANCE TODAY

The uncertain nature of future threats to American forces presents interesting challenges to military planners. As the emphasis on the littoral environment and urban warfare continues, valuable lessons can be learned from Israel's swift and successful drive into Lebanon in 1982.

Operation Peace for Galilee was epitomized by expert planning and operational excellence, as the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) achieved its stated aim of establishing a PLO-free 40 kilometer buffer zone north of its border within 40 hours. Yet, as Defense Minister Ariel Sharon manipulated its conduct, the operation grew beyond the scope of IDF military capabilities. By incorrectly identifying the PLO center of gravity as its military "fighters", the Israelis expanded their aims and found themselves in a two month siege of Beirut that resulted in mounting casualties and rising domestic dissatisfaction with the operation.

The IDF was caught unprepared for urban warfare. Its heavy armor forces were more suited to the desert terrain of its previous wars, rather than the mountainous and urban terrain of Lebanon, which favored the defender. A planned 72 hour operation lasted three months and resulted in a three year occupation of Lebanon. While full of operational excellence at its outset, the operation protracted and ended in strategic failure and erosion of its domestic support, resulting in the resignations of both the Israeli president and defense minister a year later.

INTRODUCTION

Much uncertainty looms on the horizon as America attempts to tailor its armed forces to future threats. The uncertain nature of these coming threats places a premium on innovation among the services. U.S. Marine Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak, stated in a recent issue of Navy Times that America's next war is likely to bear little resemblance to Desert Storm but rather involve combat in an urban environment against non-state actors.¹ An analysis of the employment of the Israeli Defense Force(IDF) into Lebanon in 1982, code-named Operation Peace for Galilee, has relevance to the threats that American forces face today. In this operation, Israel attempted to rid its northern territory of the threat of military and terrorist acts of the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO). This planned seventy-two hour operation grew in scope and duration as Defense Minister Ariel Sharon manipulated its conduct. The limited aims that were advertised at its outset were replaced with larger, less-defined and unachievable aims. An operation designed to establish a buffer zone for inhabitants of northern Israel grew into a two front war with Syria and the PLO and culminated in the IDF's siege of Beirut and long-term occupation of southern Lebanon. The IDF's unpreparedness in confronting the nature of the PLO threat and focus on the incorrect enemy center of gravity made an operation full of operational excellence end in strategic failure.

Events leading to the conflict went as far back as the birth of the PLO in 1964. The PLO's strategy of "armed struggle" called for phases of: terror, guerilla movement and popular war against Israel in order to establish a permanent Palestinian state.² To execute the strategy, the PLO required a base of operations. Southern Lebanon became

their base of operations in 1970 after Black September operations by King Hussein's Jordanian army destroyed thirty percent of the PLO's fighting force and ejected them from Jordanian territory.³ The expulsion from Jordan resulted in the settlement of 150,000 Palestinians in southern Lebanon and establishment of PLO headquarters in Beirut. These Palestinians joined the 200,000 Palestinians that fled to Southern Lebanon upon Israel's drive for independence in 1948.⁴

In 1975, Lebanon became embroiled in a civil war that resulted in the creation of Christian and Muslim enclaves. Syria intervened in the civil war, first on behalf of the Christians to preserve the status quo and then changed sides to support the PLO and Muslims. As Syrian forces remained in Lebanon with no intention of leaving, they became recognized in the Arab world as the Arab deterrent force in Lebanon.⁵

Throughout this period, Yassir Arafat and the PLO were increasing both in military and diplomatic power. The international arms market provided a vehicle to build and modernize PLO military might via the financial backing of wealthy Arab states.

Additionally, the PLO had increased its world diplomatic status, as evidenced by Arafat's speech to the United Nations(UN) in 1974.⁶ The increase in the military capability of the PLO brought harassing artillery barrages and terrorist attacks on the Israeli population in line with "armed struggle" strategy. In March 1978, Israel conducted Operation Litani to establish a 20 kilometer buffer zone north of Israel's border with Lebanon to rid the Israeli population of the PLO threat.⁷ The IDF advanced as far north as the Litani River, clearing a 20 kilometer buffer zone that would be enforced via a UN security force and a pro-Israeli Lebanese ground unit commanded by Major Saad Haddad.⁸

As time wore on, the PLO returned to the UN buffer zone and established armed

camps that served to reestablish a base of operations from which to continue their "armed struggle" against Israel. Prime Minister Menachem Begin's hard-line stance towards Palestinian settlements on the West Bank and Gaza Strip further distanced the Israelis and Palestinians. In April 1981, the Syrians deployed six surface-to-air missile(SAM) batteries to the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon.⁹ This caused great concern for Israel, as they previously had free reign in conducting air strikes and reconnaissance missions in the airspace over Lebanon. April was also the month in which Israeli Air Force(IAF) fighters conducted a long-range strike to destroy the Iraqi Osirak nuclear power plant.¹⁰ The international condemnation of the Osirak raid effectively gave the Israelis little power to strike the Syrian SAMs in the Bekaa Valley. In July 1981, the IAF attacked the headquarters base of the PLO in Beirut following intense PLO artillery barrages. President Reagan's Middle East envoy, Phillip Habib, negotiated a cease-fire between the two sides following the bombing.¹¹ The immediate seeds of Operation Peace for Galilee were born out of the gap in understanding of the terms of the cease-fire. For Israel, the cease-fire meant the total cessation of hostilities by the PLO, to include terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens worldwide. Whereas, the PLO viewed the cease-fire as applicable only to cross-border attacks on Israel and not applicable to their conduct of international terrorism.¹²

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Plans were drawn up for Operation Peace for Galilee as early as January of 1982. While Israeli operational planning continued, PLO artillery attacks on the Galilee portion of northern Israel grew in intensity. Between 09 May and 03 June, the PLO initiated twenty-eight artillery attacks on Galilee.¹³ The event that triggered the execute order for

the IDF came on 03 June when three gunmen attempted to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov. The gunmen were found to have ties with the PLO, with one determined to be a Colonel in Syrian Military Intelligence.¹⁴ Israel responded to this by unleashing the IAF on a massive air attack on PLO forces and infrastructure in Lebanon on 04 June. The PLO responded to the air attack with a steady artillery barrage on northern Israel through the fifth of June. D-Day for Operation Peace for Galilee came on 06 June with an H-hour of 11 o'clock in the morning. The daylight attack, although seemingly defying the principle of surprise, would rapidly overwhelm and surprise the PLO with its intensity and synchronicity.

The Israelis planned three courses of action to confront their latest threat from the PLO.¹⁵ The first plan was similar to Operation Litani, in that it aimed to establish a buffer zone between Israel's northern border and the PLO military capability in Lebanon. The difference was that this plan had the IDF advancing twenty kilometers north of the Litani River and aimed to establish a forty kilometer PLO-free zone in Lebanon. The plan did not include combat with the Syrians or an attack by Israeli troops into Beirut.

The second plan aimed at driving north in Lebanon to the outskirts of Beirut, but not committing Israeli forces in the city. The destruction of PLO elements in the city was to be executed by the pro-Israeli Lebanese Christian Phalange force. Like the first plan, there would be no combat with the Syrian forces in Lebanon.

The third plan, which came to be called "The Big Plan", called for the complete destruction of all PLO elements in Lebanon, as well as combat with Syrian forces. This plan called for an Israeli troop presence in Beirut, as well as a direct confrontation with the Syrian armored forces arrayed in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. There are varied opinions

as to which of the first two limited plans were approved by Prime Minister Begin, but history shows that it was the Big Plan that was actually executed on the battlefield, due largely to the manipulations of Defense Minister Sharon.¹⁶

As American forces have re-learned the importance of clearly defined objectives in accomplishment of the mission, the Israelis would learn this lesson during their first operation that did not have the preservation of the legitimate territory of Israel at its heart. At the operation's outset, Prime Minister Begin stated its objective as the establishment of a 40 kilometer buffer zone in Lebanon to ensure that Israeli territory was beyond the range of all PLO artillery and rocket fire.¹⁷ It was to be a seventy-two hour operation. The end state envisioned a buffer zone that would be enforced by the UN, resulting in the neutralization of the threat of artillery attack on northern Israeli inhabitants. The objective, end state and duration of the stated operation were in keeping with Israeli doctrine of choosing the time and place to go on the offensive in order to swiftly achieve limited military objectives prior to superpower intervention.¹⁸

As the operation wore on, Sharon was able to manipulate the Israeli cabinet and gain approval for the execution of his preferred option, The Big Plan. In addition to the 40 kilometer buffer zone, his expanded aims included the destruction of all PLO forces and infrastructure in Lebanon, to include the expulsion of all PLO forces from Lebanese soil. Additionally, Sharon aimed for the withdrawal of all Syrian forces in Lebanon and the establishment of a Maronite Christian-led government that would allow Israel to sign a peace treaty with a second Arab nation.¹⁹ Sharon expertly deceived both the government and people of Israel in order to advance his preferred option. The IDF and Israeli nation as a whole would pay dearly for this as the operation became protracted and

IDF casualties mounted disproportionately to battlefield gains.

Israel's planning phase was highlighted by operational expertise in designing a plan that would rapidly overwhelm PLO forces, yet fell short in the area of enemy center of gravity determination. The PLO was split into many factions and not all factions pursued a common ideology. Although the military arm of the PLO had modern combat equipment obtained via huge financial support from wealthy Arab states, its training in the proper employment of the equipment was poor. The PLO was a political force incapable of getting in the way of IDF military goals. Its strength was not its military but rather its political arm and the ability to keep the Palestinian state issue on the world stage.²⁰ The PLO's use of the media was also a critical strength that Israel did not account for. By misidentifying the PLO as a conventional military force that could be defeated in conventional military ways, Israeli planners committed a huge strategic blunder.

In regards to the Syrian forces in Lebanon, Israeli planning properly identified the Syrian center of gravity as its armored divisions in the Bekaa Valley. By avoiding a strength-on-strength situation, the Israelis attacked the Syrian strength indirectly by unleashing the IAF to destroy the Syrian air defense network. With their SAM and fighter aircraft protective umbrella removed, Syrian forces were subject to unimpeded air and ground attack and were forced to withdraw from their positions in the Bekaa Valley.

Because of Israel's lack of strategic depth, trading space for time was not a consideration. The territory of Israel was considered too valuable and giving up any of it was not an option. Therefore, in keeping with IDF doctrine, time is a critical element of success and was the key ingredient of the operation. The IDF had to strike quickly and

achieve its operational objectives prior to superpower involvement. The plan called for a lightning-quick three pronged assault into Lebanon. Since eighty percent of the IDF requires call-up from the reserves, rapid mobilization was required for success.²¹

The Israeli force was divided into three large mechanized maneuver forces that would attack in three sectors and aggressively negotiate the challenging urban and mountainous terrain of southern Lebanon. The western force's mission was to rapidly advance up the coastal highway, bypassing the coastal cities of Tyre and Sidon in order to cut off the PLO forces north of Sidon and drive towards Beirut. Smaller, mobile forces would serve to clear the urban areas and refugee camps of PLO fighters once they were sealed off. Naval forces would play a key role by conducting amphibious landings to the rear of PLO fighters, as well as providing coastal bombardment to support the northern advance. The western force consisted of two reinforced divisions totaling 22,000 troops and 220 tanks.²²

The center force was given responsibility of driving north via the arduous terrain of the Lebanese Mountains in order to secure the key road junction of Arnon Heights, from which one task force would proceed northwest to link up with the western force outside the coastal city of Sidon and another task force would continue the advance north towards the Beirut-Damascus highway. This force consisted of roughly two divisions totaling 18,000 troops and 220 tanks.²³

The eastern force was the largest of the armored maneuver elements and faced the most potent threat, the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley. Its mission centered on destroying the large Syrian armored force, if called upon to do so, and continuing the drive north to the Beirut-Damascus highway to cut off the Syrian forces from their lifeline to

Damascus. This force was corps-size and consisted of 38,000 troops and 800 tanks plus the operational reserve, a 9000 man division with 200 tanks. It faced a formidable Syrian armored threat totaling 30,000 troops, as well as close to 600 tanks.²⁴

OPERATIONAL EXECUTION

At 1100 on 06 June, the IDF conducted a swift, simultaneous armored attack into Lebanon in three sectors. In the western sector, a rapid advance along the coastal road along with amphibious landings north of the coastal cities of Tyre and Sidon surprised and enveloped the PLO fighters and caused them to flee north towards Beirut or east into the Lebanese mountains.²⁵ The pockets of resistance in the urban areas and PLO camps significantly slowed the Israeli advance, as strict rules of engagement to limit civilian casualties were adhered to. By 08 June, IDF elements were as far north as Damour, just 15 kilometers south of Beirut.

The center force overcame the challenging terrain of the Lebanese mountains to drive north and secure the key terrain of the Arnon Heights road junction, allowing one unit to head west from the road junction and link up with the western force and another unit to continue north towards its objective of the Beirut-Damascus highway. The key terrain surrounding the Beaufort Castle was bypassed by the armored force and left to a special forces unit that seized the castle and its PLO defenders on the first night.²⁶ By 08 June, the Beaufort Castle was in Israeli hands and the sector's main force was closing in on Ain Zhalta, just twelve kilometers south of the Beirut-Damascus highway.

The large eastern force conducted a two-prong advance along the eastern ridge of the Lebanese mountains and the western ridge of the Anti-Lebanon mountains in order to outflank the Syrian force arrayed in the center of Bekaa Valley. The Corps' center force

halted in the Bekaa Valley and waited for orders to attack the large Syrian force.

Shortly after the operation began, America launched a large diplomatic effort to gain concessions from Israel to refrain from attacking the Syrians and to abstain from entering the capital of Beirut. President Reagan sent envoy Phillip Habib to the region to broker a peace, but Israel's swift success on the battlefield and the quest for additional military objectives provided little incentive for negotiation. In 40 hours of combat, the IDF had advanced north more than 60 kilometers, resulting in the destruction of most of the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon.²⁷

09 June became a key day in the operation as Defense Minister Sharon gained approval to attack Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley. The Syrian deployment of additional SAM batteries to Lebanon provided the spark Sharon needed to initiate the IDF attack under the guise of force protection. In a fierce three hour battle, 17 of 19 Syrian SAMs were destroyed and 29 Syrian MIGs were shot down by the IAF.²⁸ The IDF executed a truly combined arms approach, as they targeted the SAMs by air, artillery and electronic counter measure assets and effectively destroyed the air defense umbrella over Syrian and PLO forces in the eastern sector. The Syrians executed an orderly withdrawal north in Bekaa Valley as the eastern force continued their drive towards the Beirut-Damascus highway. By 10 June, the Syrians had lost 90 of their front-line MIGs and all of their SAMs were either destroyed or rendered unusable.²⁹

The overwhelming success of the IDF led to a cease-fire between Israeli and Syrian forces on 11 June and this was extended to the PLO on 12 June. Upon the cease-fire, the center and eastern forces were arrayed just south of the Beirut-Damascus highway and the western force threatened the outskirts of Beirut. The cease-fire with the

PLO lasted only one day as both sides charged the other with violations. Once the cease-fire was broken, the IDF advanced in the west to encircle PLO and Syrian forces in West Beirut. The IDF executed a creeping attack to further seal in Beirut while negotiations were conducted to force a PLO withdrawal from the city. By 14 June, PLO and Syrian forces in Beirut were encircled within a 25 kilometer zone. A ten day operational pause in the fighting occurred between 12 and 22 June as diplomatic efforts to prevent an Israeli attack on Beirut increased. This pause allowed PLO forces trapped in Beirut to fortify their positions as Arafat stated that his forces would fight to the death, making Beirut a modern-day version of Stalingrad.³⁰ The cease-fire broke down on 22 June as the IDF attacked PLO and Syrian forces east of Beirut to clear a zone east along the Beirut-Damascus highway. By 25 June, the encirclement of Beirut was complete as IDF and Phalange forces sealed in the city and secured 15 kilometers of the Beirut-Damascus highway east of Beirut.³¹ Thus began the two month siege of Beirut.

Israel found itself in a dilemma. Their Lebanese allies, the Christian Phalange force under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel, refused to conduct an urban assault on Beirut to destroy the PLO elements in the city.³² This left Israel with a choice between conducting their own urban assault on the city or adopting an attrition-style siege of the city to negotiate a PLO and Syrian withdrawal. Facing an increasingly hostile world and domestic reaction to their protracted war in Lebanon, they chose the siege option and started the squeeze of Beirut by shutting off food, water and electricity in the city and conducting sporadic air, artillery and naval bombardments to help the negotiations along. During the cease-fire, IDF units advanced in small doses to realize piecemeal territorial gains on the outskirts of Beirut while casualties and Israeli domestic dissatisfaction with

the operation grew.³³ In an effort to further help the negotiations for a PLO withdrawal, Sharon ordered a massive air, artillery and naval bombardment of PLO headquarters in Beirut on 12 August, which incited a swarm of unfavorable world opinion. This was followed by a cease-fire called by the Israeli cabinet, which had had enough of Sharon's deceptive and manipulative execution of the operation and decided to strip the Defense Minister of his decision-making power.³⁴ The cease-fire held and the PLO withdrawal from Beirut under the direction of a multi-national force of French legionnaires, Italian paratroopers and U.S. Marines began on 21 August. Operation Peace for Galilee was effectively over, yet the questions surrounding this planned three day operation that grew into three months and required a three year occupation of Lebanon had just begun.

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED

Marine General Richard Neal guards against the "Tyranny of the Four T's" in devising a recipe for the successful conduct of future military conflicts.³⁵ An analysis of three of General Neal's four Ts: time, technology and tactics during Operation Peace for Galilee provides lessons relevant to today's environment. Both military and civilian strategists emphasize the criticality of time in America's next conflict. Most agree that tomorrow's conflicts will bear little resemblance to Desert Storm, with the likely adversary being culturally and morally different than a conventional western-style military force. Israel's rapid mobilization effort in 1982 is something to be emulated, as the next U.S. conflict is not likely to allow a lengthy build-up phase reminiscent of Desert Shield.

Israel's limited objective of clearing a buffer zone to free its citizens in Galilee from PLO artillery attack was successfully accomplished in 40 hours, causing PLO

fighters to execute a disorganized withdrawal. But, as Israel expanded its war aims and the operation became protracted, the erosion of their strategic center of gravity began. Israel found itself bogged down in the outskirts of Beirut, faced with mounting friendly casualties and piecemeal military gains directed against a determined irregular opponent on familiar urban terrain. The will of the Israeli people began to wane and protests to end the war mounted. Popular discontent with the protraction that accompanied the siege of Beirut, to include the outrage that followed the murder of Palestinian refugees by Gemayel's Phalange force after PLO fighters had exited the city, fell squarely in the hands of the Israeli government. This resulted in the resignations of Defense Minister Sharon in February 1983 and President Begin later that year.³⁶ Democratic societies are forever learning that support of the civilian populace will erode as war protracts beyond its initial aims without the achievement of appreciable gains.

While some argue that an advantage in technology will ensure future military success, becoming blinded by past success can be disastrous. Israel fell to this common effect known as fighting your last war. The IDF tailored its ground force to be completely mechanized and armor-heavy in response to its previous conflicts undertaken in desert or open terrain. Quite different from past wars, the terrain of Lebanon favored the defender. The coastal region, although flat, was limited to one road suitable for armor and offered great ambush opportunities for the PLO as citrus and olive groves dominated both sides of the road. A better trained and more disciplined enemy could have overcome the technological advances of Israeli armor by setting up tank-killing zones and exploiting the ambush opportunities of the terrain. Likewise, the mountainous terrain of the central and eastern sectors effectively channelized the Israeli armored units and

allowed exploitation by both Syrian and PLO tank-killing teams.

Two Israeli capabilities that were unaffected by the terrain were the amphibious assault capability of its Navy as well as the versatility and lethality inherent in the IAF. The Israelis executed a truly joint operation that combined air, land and maritime capabilities to overwhelm and confuse the enemy and enable a mass of armored ground forces to successfully drive north. The IDF has always emphasized the human factor in equipping the man to exploit technology, rather than just manning high-tech equipment. As the technological playing field is sure to be leveled in future conflicts, it serves as a potent reminder of the importance of understanding the limitations of a high-tech force.

While tactical proficiency is a must in ensuring military success, the application of set-piece tactics to all situations can lead to failure. Israel was unprepared for the urban combat that it faced in fighting the PLO. An analysis similar to what General Krulak calls a "cultural Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield(IPB) to reveal the structure and support mechanisms of an opponent that seems rag-tag and disorganized on the surface", would have uncovered the PLO's strength in blending in with the local populace.³⁷ The final phase of the PLO's "armed struggle" strategy calls for Palestinian civilians to rise up and join arms in a popular war. While this did not occur during the operation, the PLO used the Palestinian refugee population to shield its fighters from the IDF. Knowing Israel's concern for the safety of non-combatants, the PLO fighters melted into the refugee camps and urban areas and in some cases used their own people as hostages to complicate the IDF's mission of sanitizing Lebanon of the PLO threat. This severely slowed down the IDF's tempo, as care was taken to only conduct urban clearing operations during daylight hours in order to limit collateral damage and harm to

civilians. Additionally, the PLO exploited the media by alleging the indiscriminate killing of civilians and damage to civilian structures by the IDF. While some of this was a natural consequence of urban warfare, a large amount was due to the placement of PLO units and equipment in areas concentrated with civilians, as well as using hospitals and other non-military structures for their own military purposes.³⁸

The lessons of Operation Peace for Galilee have particular relevance today. As the trend towards shifting of the population base into cities and along the littorals continues, the emphasis of the US Marine Corps is shifting towards military operations on urbanized terrain(MOUT). As the global trend continues towards non-state actors with armed forces of "fighters" rather than soldiers, one of the key advantages of these "fighters" will be their proximity to civilians in their urban base of operations.³⁹ The IDF learned in the siege of Beirut and clearing operations in refugee camps and coastal cities that a constrained use of firepower is paramount to mission success, as the media is sure to focus on the effects of collateral damage. This measured use of firepower in future conflicts will involve the use of non-lethal as well as precision weapons. As the Israelis learned that a large armored force has serious limitations in urban terrain and the protraction of a limited operation can seriously degrade the domestic support required of a democracy, so can the U.S. armed services learn from this operation. As General Krulak submits: "our tool kit for the future must hold more than sledgehammers".⁴⁰

NOTES

¹ Charles C. Krulak, "Not Like Yesterday," Navy Times, January 19, 1998, 14.

² Tzvi Lanir, PLO's Concept of Armed Struggle in the test of the Peace for Galilee Campaign (Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1988), 3.

³ Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁵ M. Thomas Davis, 40km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 60.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁷ Gabriel, 57.

⁸ Davis, 60.

⁹ Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, Flawed Victory: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and The 1982 War In Lebanon (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986), 63.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Dupuy, 94.

¹⁴ Gabriel, 63.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁹ Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus And War: Israel In Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 3.

²⁰ Davis, 112.

²¹ Gabriel, 29.

²² *Ibid.*, 76.

²³ Ibid., 78.

²⁴ Ibid., 80.

²⁵ Dupuy, 98.

²⁶ Ibid., 103.

²⁷ Ibid., 108.

²⁸ Ibid., 120.

²⁹ Gabriel, 97.

³⁰ Davis, 97.

³¹ Dupuy, 140.

³² Gabriel, 132.

³³ Ibid., 142.

³⁴ Ibid., 158.

³⁵ Richard I. Neal, "Planning for Tomorrow's Conflicts: A Recipe for Success," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1997, 15.

³⁶ Davis, 102.

³⁷ Charles C. Krulak, "Operational Maneuver From The Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1997, 28.

³⁸ Gabriel, 118.

³⁹ Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (Washington, DC: 1996), 4.

⁴⁰ Krulak, Proceedings, 30.

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